The two types of dissociation: detachment and compartmentalization

The term dissociation is often colloquially used as though it refers to a single, unified phenomenon, but in practice it encompasses a wide range of experiences that differ in both structure and cause. Its meaning has become so diffuse—applied to everything from ordinary lapses in attention to severe disorders involving structural fragmentation of self-experience—that it resists precise definition. This imprecision is not just semantic; it conceals a crucial distinction between two fundamentally different mechanisms. As outlined by Holmes et al. 2005​ , rather than referring to a single, unified process, dissociation is best conceptualized as emerging from two fundamentally different mechanisms: detachment and compartmentalization.

These mechanisms are not simply variations of the same phenomenon but distinct cognitive processes that exist on a spectrum from normal to pathological. Detachment—which involves a sense of disconnection from reality, the body, or emotions—is a universal experience that can range from mild and adaptive (e.g., getting lost in thought) to chronic and distressing (e.g., depersonalization disorder). Compartmentalization, on the other hand, is a fundamental cognitive process that allows people to separate conflicting thoughts, emotions, or roles—such as maintaining a professional demeanor at work while processing personal grief at home. While this mechanism is present in everyone, in its most extreme form, it becomes the core pathology of dissociative identity disorder (DID). For individuals with DID, compartmentalization is not just a way to navigate conflicting emotions—it is a deeply ingrained unconscious survival mechanism that partitions aspects of self to maintain psychological stability (Holmes et al. 2005​ , Lanius et al. 2014​ )

Despite this distinction between detachment dissociation and compartmentalization dissociation being well established in the academic literature, it is often blurred or entirely overlooked in colloquial discussions of dissociation (Loewenstein 2018​ ). In this post, I differentiate between these two types of dissociation.

Detachment dissociation#

Detachment dissociation is often what people mean when they use the word “dissociation”. It refers to a disconnection from the present moment, one’s emotions, body, or external reality. Individuals experiencing detachment may feel distant, emotionally numb, or as if they are observing life from the outside rather than fully participating in it. This state can be temporary or chronic, creating a sense of psychological distance that dulls emotional intensity or makes the world feel unreal. Detachment serves as a protective mechanism, allowing individuals to cope with stress or overwhelming experiences by reducing their immediate engagement with reality.

How pathological detachment may manifest#

Because detachment is a broad phenomenon, it manifests in different ways depending on severity and context. Some concepts constructed to further categorize types of detachment dissociation include:

• Depersonalization – A sense of disconnection from one’s body, thoughts, or emotions, often described as feeling robotic, hollow, or like an observer of oneself.
• Derealization – A sense of detachment from the external world, making it feel dreamlike, distant, or unreal.
• Out-of-body experiences – Phenomena in which a person perceives themselves as floating outside their body, watching events unfold from an external perspective.
• Emotional numbing – A lack of emotional response, making events feel intellectually recognized but not truly “felt”.
• Immersive daydreaming – A tendency to become deeply absorbed in one’s internal world, sometimes to the point of losing awareness of external reality.
• Flashbacks with dissociation – In PTSD, flashbacks can sometimes be accompanied by detachment rather than emotional re-experiencing, leading to a sense of watching the trauma unfold without feeling personally engaged.

Detachment exists on a continuum from normal experiences to clinical disorders. At one extreme, mild detachment occurs transiently in everyday life—such as zoning out while driving. In the middle ground, more pronounced detachment is found in trauma-related dissociation, PTSD, autism, inattentive ADHD, depression, and anxiety disorders. At the far extreme, chronic and severe detachment can become pathological, as in depersonalization-derealization disorder, where individuals experience prolonged or permanent feelings of unreality (Dell and O'Neil 2009​ , Medford et al. 2018​ , Lyssenko et al. 2017​ ).

One may experience “amnesia” due to the improper encoding of memories due to detachment dissociation, but this is a fundamentally different mechanism than the memory loss associated with compartmentalization dissociation (Holmes et al. 2005​ , Langeslag and Posey 2023​ ).

Compartmentalization dissociation#

Unlike detachment, which involves a disconnection from the present moment, compartmentalization involves the structural division of self-experience into separate, often inaccessible compartments. While detachment is a transient regulatory process, compartmentalization creates lasting dissociative barriers that fragment memory, self-awareness, and agency (van der Hart et al. 2006​ , Lanius et al. 2014​ )

At its core, all forms of compartmentalization dissociation originate from disavowal—a subconscious rejection of awareness that prevents integration¹. This is not a conscious choice to ignore or suppress something, but an automatic, preemptive separation of experience before it can enter awareness. When an overwhelming or contradictory experience arises, instead of being integrated into memory, it is immediately sequestered, remaining inaccessible except under specific conditions (Howell 2005​ , Ellenberger 1970​ , van der Hart et al. 2006​ )

How pathological compartmentalization may manifest#

This process of disavowal gives rise to the defining features of compartmentalization dissociation:

• Amnesia and memory fragmentation – Certain experiences become inaccessible, either entirely or in a state-dependent manner.
• State-dependent switching – Knowledge, emotions, or capacities may be rigidly separated internally, resulting in discontinuities in internal experience.
• Contradictory self-perceptions – The person may present differently across contexts without recognizing the incoherence.
• Mode-switching – Sudden, involuntary shifts in behavior, emotion, voice, or perspective, triggered by internal or external cues.

Compartmentalization exists in everyone to some degree—people routinely shift roles, suppress emotions, or isolate distressing memories. But when early, repeated trauma forces the overuse of compartmentalization, the process may become rigid and uncontrollable. Instead of flexibly holding conflicting feelings, the mind may cordon them off into isolated compartments, preventing integration into a continuous self-experience (Schimmenti 2017​ ).

Compartmentalization is what makes DID distinct among dissociative disorders. In its extreme form, it generates rigid, discrete boundaries that prevent fluid awareness between states. Unlike detachment—which is widely experienced—compartmentalization becomes pathological only when disavowal is relied on repeatedly during early development as a coping strategy (van der Kolk and Fisler 1995​ , Dell and O'Neil 2009​ , Reinders et al. 2006​ , Schimmenti 2017​ ).

Why this distinction matters#

As used today, the term dissociation is so imprecise that it frequently obscures the very phenomena it aims to describe. The failure to differentiate between detachment and compartmentalization has led to conceptual slippage—particularly in how DID is understood and communicated (Loewenstein 2018​ ).

• Detachment is a transient, often protective disconnection from the here-and-now. It is common in many conditions, including PTSD, anxiety, and autism.
• Compartmentalization is a structural fragmentation of self-processes. It becomes pathological when overused, especially during early developmental stages.
• DID is a disorder of pathological compartmentalization—not of “multiple identities”, but of severe, involuntary division of memory, perception, and agency.

The dominant model of DID interprets this compartmentalization as “identity fragmentation”—the idea of multiple identities or parts inhabiting one body. But this is an applied conceptual layer, not the core mechanism. Compartmentalization describes the underlying dissociative process: the rigid separation of memory, emotion, and self-experience. Identity fragmentation is one possible interpretation/outcome of this process, but compartmentalization itself does not necessitate identity fragmentation. Individuals may experience profound compartmentalization—such as amnesia, sudden shifts in affect, or changes in cognitive capacity—without interpreting these experiences through the lens of identity division. Compartmentalization captures identity fragmentation within its broader framework, but identity fragmentation does not fully encapsulate the complexity of compartmentalization. This is why DID is better understood as a disorder of compartmentalization rather than identity fragmentation.

While detachment and compartmentalization can and often do co-occur, they arise from different psychological processes and carry different implications. Recognizing this distinction is essential for the precise understanding, conceptualization, and communication of dissociative experiences.